University of Wyoming College of Law

Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship
Faculty Articles

UW College of Law Faculty Scholarship

7-29-2010

Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of
Story
Kenneth D. Chestek
University of Wyoming College of Law, kchestek@uwyo.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/faculty_articles

Recommended Citation
Chestek, Kenneth D., "Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of Story" (2010). Faculty
Articles. 34.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/faculty_articles/34

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the UW College of Law Faculty Scholarship at Law
Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized
administrator of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

JAWLD_typeset_v18-PRF-04

6/25/10

1:01 PM

Page 1

Judging by the Numbers:
An Empirical Study of the Power of Story
Kenneth D. Chestek*
I will seek someone who understands that justice isn’t about some
abstract legal theory or footnote in a case book; it is also about how our
laws affect the daily realities of people’s lives—whether they can make a
living and care for their families; whether they feel safe in their homes
and welcome in their own nation. I view that quality of empathy, of
understanding and identifying with people’s hopes and struggles, as an
essential ingredient for arriving at just decisions and outcomes.
— President Barack Obama1
[O]ur system will only be further corrupted as a result of President
Obama’s views that, in tough cases, the critical ingredient for a judge is
the “depth and breadth of one’s empathy.”
—Sen. Jeff Sessions 2

The recent retirement of Justice David Souter from the Supreme
Court touched off a public debate about the extent to which a judge’s
personal history and experiences should, or should not, inform his or her

* © Kenneth D. Chestek 2010. Clinical Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law–Indianapolis. This article is based
on a presentation that the author made to the Applied Legal Storytelling Conference, Chapter Two: Once Upon a Legal Story,
held at Lewis & Clark Law School in Portland, Oregon in July 2009; I am grateful for the excellent feedback and discussion by
participants at that conference. I was assisted during the design phase of my study by Professors Ruth Anne Robbins, Richard
Neumann, and Michael Smith, who helped me kick around ideas for how to isolate the “story” variable in order to create a
meaningful study. I also want to thank the members of the combined Indiana Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and the
Appellate Practice Committee of the Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association, all of whom provided input to the
design of the study. I also wish to thank Professors Ruth Anne Robbins, Ruth Vance, and Laura Graham, who participated in
a small-group session with me at the Legal Writing Institute’s 2009 Writer’s Workshop in Welches, Oregon; the faculties at
Indiana University School of Law–Indianapolis and the Lewis & Clark Law School for providing valuable input after faculty
colloquia; and Professors Kathy Stanchi, Linda Edwards, and Susan Duncan for their helpful comments. I would also like to
thank my research assistants, Kelly Brummett (who managed the online survey expertly) and Shena Wheeler (who provided
valuable research assistance on the article itself ).
1 Remarks of President Barack Obama, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs (May 1, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Press-Briefing-By-Press-Secretary-Robert-Gibbs-5-1-09/) (accessed Apr. 3,
2010). President Obama made an unannounced visit to the podium during the daily press briefing.
2 See Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (July 13, 2009, opening statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) (available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearings/testimony .cfm?id=3959&wit_id=515).
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decision making. President Obama said while campaigning for office, and
again upon learning of the impending vacancy, that “empathy” was a
quality he valued in a Supreme Court justice. Predictably, conservative
senators attacked this statement as “code” for “biased judges.”3 But does
this debate obscure a more basic reality: that all judges’ perceptions are
shaped by their own personal histories?
Modern thinking in brain science and cognitive psychology suggests
that humans cannot help but interpret the world they see through the lens
of their personal experiences.4 A more productive discussion, therefore,
might begin by acknowledging that fact, and then studying how those
experiences might (or might not) inform the application of legal principles
to result in a just decision.
The role of empathy, or emotional reasoning,5 in judicial thinking is a
controversial question. But before we can fully address the proper role, if
any, for emotional reasoning in judging, several preliminary questions
need to be examined. First, are judges actually influenced by emotional
reasoning, which classical rhetoricians would refer to as pathos-based
appeals? And, if so, by what mechanism does this influence occur? If in
fact judges are influenced by pathos-based appeals, and if we know how
that occurs, we will then be in a position to discuss whether this influence
is a good thing, or something to try to avoid.
One form of a pathos-based appeal is storytelling. Stories (which
some scholars refer to as “narrative reasoning”6) work because they allow
readers to imagine for themselves how the protagonist might be feeling,
and relate that feeling to the readers’ own experiences.7

3 Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Republican of Utah, speaking on ABC’s This Week Today in May 2009, called empathy a “code
word for an activist judge” who would be “partisan on the bench.” ABC News This Week, Sens. Leahy & Hatch (May 3, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/story?id=7491153&page=1 (accessed Apr. 3, 2010). The subsequent nomination and
debate over the confirmation of Judge Sonia Sotomayor continued in the same vein. See Nomination, supra n. 2. But cf. Ben
Bratman, A Defense of Sotomayor’s “Wise Latina” Remark—with No Rewording Required (July 17, 2009),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20090717_bratman.html (accessed Apr. 3, 2010) (arguing that in employment
discrimination cases, her background as a Latina could help her imagine the perspective of a person claiming discrimination,
as the law often requires a judge to do). Curiously, conservative Senators did not object to President George H.W. Bush’s
endorsement of Clarence Thomas as a “warm, intelligent person who has great empathy . . . .” Excerpts from News Conference
Announcing Court Nominee, N.Y. Times A14 (July 2, 1991) (available at 1991 WLNR 31110).
4 See e.g. Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error 96–97 (Putnam 1994); George Lakoff, Whose Freedom? The Battle over
America’s Most Important Idea 16 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2006) (describing how a person’s thinking is “constrained by the
frames and metaphors shaping your brain and limiting how you see the world”).
5 Classical rhetoricians would refer to this as an “appeal to pathos.” Aristotle described three modes of persuasion: ethos,
deriving from the character of the speaker; pathos, drawing on the attitudes created in the audience; and logos, relying on the
demonstration of argument. The Rhetoric of Aristotle 8 (Lane Cooper trans., D. Appleton & Co. 1932).
6 Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 Leg. Stud. Forum 1,
9–10 (1996).
7 Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, Minding The Law 30–31 (Harv. U. Press 2000) (arguing that humans are
predisposed to use narrative structure to construct meaning out of the events of everyday life); Michael J. Higdon, Something
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This article focuses on the question of whether appellate judges are
actually influenced by the stories of the litigants who appear before them.
Part I will describe what I call the “DNA model of persuasion,” setting
forth the hypothesis that logical argumentation, while a necessary part of
persuasion, is not sufficient by itself and that using the form of a story to
weave a pathos-based appeal into a brief will produce a more persuasive
document. Part II of this article will describe a study that I devised and
implemented to test whether appellate judges find story argumentation
persuasive; Part III will present the results of the study. Part IV addresses
possible objections to the validity of the test and the sample collected. Part
V will begin an analysis of what the data might mean. Among other things,
I conclude that stories are indeed persuasive to appellate judges and
others, but also that recent law school graduates are not as impressed by
stories as more experienced lawyers (and judges) are. Finally, I suggest that
stories are helpful because, properly done, they evoke emotional responses
within the reader that make the legal claim seem more “real,” and hence
believable, to the reader.

I. The DNA Model for Persuasive Writing
Stories have gotten a bum rap. Most people think of “stories” as entertaining works of fiction,8 lies, or falsehoods.9 The prosecution in a
criminal case is likely to characterize the defendant’s version of events as a
“story,” implying that it lacks credibility.
Yet intuitively, we know that stories persuade. Stories are inherently
interesting. We grow up listening to stories, and we learn to tell stories to
each other.10 We are entertained by stories. Politicians and public speakers
often use stories to make points and to teach, and often to persuade. A
good story affects the listener, or the reader, at a gut level. When the
audience reacts in the way the storyteller intends, the reader will “get” the
message internally in a way that is profound. But are stories too “soft” or
unreliable to include in appellate briefs? To the extent that stories present

Judicious This Way Comes . . . The Use of Foreshadowing as a Persuasive Device in Judicial Narrative, 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. ___
(2010) (manuscript at 8–9) (collecting scholarship showing that readers of narratives must actively engage the text in order to
create meaning, thereby creating a powerful opportunity to persuade).
8 Among the alternative definitions provided by Webster’s Dictionary are: “2 a: an account of some incident or event; often:
a tale written or told esp. for the entertainment of children”; “3 b: a fiction that is shorter or has a more unified plot than the
usual novel.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (unabridged ed., G & C Merriam Co. 1961).
9 “6: fib, lie, falsehood.” Id.
10 Storyteller Kendall Haven claims that stories go back 100,000 years in human history, even predating language. Kendall
Haven, Story Proof: The Science Behind the Startling Power of Story 3 (Libs. Unlimited 2007).
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an appeal to pathos, as opposed to logos, are they inappropriate in
appellate advocacy?
Some appellate judges claim that they are persuaded only by the legal
argument, not by any emotional appeal. Some reject the notion that
emotional appeal has any place in appellate advocacy.11 The rule of law,
they claim, requires logical arguments, clearly and neutrally applied. For
example, Justice Antonin Scalia and author Bryan Garner argue that
“[a]ppealing to judges’ emotions is misguided . . . . Good judges pride
themselves on the rationality of their rulings and the suppression of their
personal proclivities, including most especially their emotions.”12 Instead
of emotional appeals, they write, “persuasion is possible only because all
human beings are born with a capacity for logical thought. . . . The most
rigorous form of logic, and hence the most persuasive, is the syllogism.”13
Senior Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert writes that a brief is “nothing more or less
than an expanded categorical syllogism.”14
But is this formulation complete? Is there no room for judicial
intuition,15 or any form of emotional reasoning? In short, are stories inappropriate forms of argumentation?
My claim in this article (and one I have made elsewhere16) is that logic
alone is not the best method of persuasion. Rather, a sound legal argument

11 Some United States Senators apparently agree. See comments of Sens. Jeff Sessions and Orrin Hatch, supra n. 2 & 3.
12 Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges 32 (Thomson West 2008). There is
some evidence that Justice Scalia practices what he preaches about not letting emotional reactions influence legal outcomes.
In a recent dissent from a petition granting a writ of habeas corpus, he wrote:
This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full
and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is “actually” innocent.
In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (emphasis in original).
13 Scalia & Garner, supra n. 12, at 41. To be fair, Scalia & Garner do admit that
there is a distinction between an overt appeal to emotion and the setting forth of facts that may engage the
judge’s emotions uninvited. You may safely work into your statement of facts that your client is an elderly widow
seeking to retain her lifelong home. But don’t make an overt, passionate attempt to play upon the judicial heartstring. It can have a nasty backlash.
Id. at 32. Although the authors don’t explain why it is okay to make covert emotional appeals but not overt ones, I do agree
with this advice. See text accompanying infra n. 99.
14 Ruggero J. Aldisert, Winning On Appeal: Better Briefs and Oral Arguments 21 (2d ed., NITA 2003). Judge Aldisert admits
that trial lawyers often do, and probably should, rely on “shamelessly emotional matters,” but he cautions the advocate “not
[to] carry this stuff upstairs to the appellate court.” Id. at 5. On the other hand, he does advise “that the statement of facts [in
an appellate brief should] command and retain the reader’s attention. Do not bore the judge. Do not make the brief difficult
to read. Do not clutter the narrative. Come closer to Ernest Hemingway than Beltway bureaucratese.” Id. at 165. He also
devotes a few paragraphs advising lawyers to “ ‘tell a story’ in the facts sections of briefs.” Id. at 168.
15 Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit admits that “[i]ntuition plays a major
role in judicial as in most decision making.” Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 107 (Harv. U. Press 2008). Judge Posner also
quotes a recent interview with current Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy in which Justice Kennedy suggests that
many judges begin with a “quick judgment[]” and then determine whether that judgment “makes sense, if it’s logical, if it’s fair,
if it accords with the law, if it accords with the Constitution, if it accords with your own sense of ethics and morality.” Id. at
257.
16 See Kenneth Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 Leg. Writing 127 (2008).
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combined with a strong story will be more persuasive than the bare legal
argument. At the trial level, this is certainly true. As Professor Robert
Burns has noted, trial lawyers can
construct their case from a double helix of norms. One of those strands
is constituted by the law of rules. The other strand is constituted by the
norms that find their natural home within the life-world of the judge and
jury. These common sense norms are embedded primarily in the
different sorts of narratives that the trial lawyer may employ at trial, from
the fully characterized storytelling of the opening statement to the more
Spartan narratives of direct examination.17

The image of a “double helix” DNA molecule provides a useful
analogy with which to visualize the persuasive process. To insure that
decisions are based upon neutral principles, evenly and predictably
applied to any set of facts, the law requires a strictly logical component;
let’s call that the “logos strand” of the double helix. But pure logic is insufficient in many types of decision making, even at the appellate level. For
example, sometimes the legislature enacts a statute that gives the courts
wide discretion to decide cases because the possible range of human
conduct that might fall within the scope of the statute is too vast for a
legislative body to anticipate.18 In other situations, courts have developed

17 Robert P. Burns, Studying Evidence Law in the Context of Trial Practices, 50 St. Louis U. L.J. 1155, 1171 (2006); see also J.
Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 Leg. Writing 53 (2008). One study of how
trial judges decide cases discusses the interplay of “intuitive” and “deliberative” reasoning processes (similar to the “story” and
“logos” threads). See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide
Cases, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2007).
Jerome Bruner describes this dichotomy as follows:
There are two modes of cognitive function, two modes of thought, each providing distinctive ways of ordering
experience, of constructing reality. The two (though complementary) are irreducible to one another. Efforts to
reduce one mode to the other or to ignore one at the expense of the other inevitably fail to capture the rich
diversity of thought. . . . A good story and a well-formed argument are different natural kinds. Both can be used
as means for convincing another. Yet what they convince of is fundamentally different: arguments convince one
of their truth, stories of their lifelikeness. . . . [T]he structure of a well-formed logical argument differs radically
from that of a well-wrought story.
Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds 11 (Harv. U. Press 1986). For a fuller discussion of how narrative reasoning
differs from logical reasoning, see Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A
Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 259, 266–269
(2009).
18 The law abounds with examples of subjective tests that require consideration of more than just logic. For example,
sentencing decisions require a trial court to weigh individual characteristics of the defendant in determining the appropriate
sentence. See e.g. Hayley Bennett and Tony Broe, Judicial Neurobiology, Markarian Synthesis and Emotion: How Can the
Human Brain Make Sentencing Decisions? 31 Crim. L. J. 75 (2007). For another example, while the Sherman Antitrust Act
criminalizes the act of “monopoliz[ing]” or “attempt[ing] to monopolize,” 15 U.S.C. § 2, it leaves the definition of the term
“monopolize” to the courts, which have developed a vast array of tests and criteria to help them differentiate between legal
and illegal monopolies. See e.g. Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future, 75 Cal.
L. Rev. 959 (1987). In discussing the rule of judge-made doctrines in adding substance to the skeleton of the Sherman Act,
Judge Posner has said, “The progress in antitrust law owes nothing to legalism. Judges and Justices did not learn to read the
Sherman Act more carefully. Instead they learned more about how the economy operates.” Posner, supra n. 15, at 376. In
other words, logic alone was not enough; judges had to rely upon narrative reasoning to give the Act substance.
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(either as part of the common law or in response to a broad grant of
discretion in interpreting statutory or constitutional law) tests that require
judges to weigh various factors before rendering judgment.19 For example,
balancing tests almost by definition require reasoning processes beyond
pure logic.20 (How much “weight” does a judge give to the privacy interest
of a criminal defendant in determining the reasonableness of a search of
his car?) Likewise, a “totality of the circumstances” test invites the judge to
examine a body of evidence to render a decision without specifying the
logical rules required to evaluate that evidence.21 In such cases, it seems
that another form of reasoning must join with the purely logical application of rules to allow the judge to make any decision at all.
For the purpose of this article, I will call this other form of reasoning
“story argumentation” or “story reasoning.”22 This becomes the second
strand of the DNA molecule. My hypothesis is that a brief that relies
purely on a logos-based argument will be lifeless, just as a single strand of
the DNA molecule is incomplete. Winding in a solid story-based
argument will bring the brief to life.23

19 For example, employment discrimination law may require even an appellate judge to try to imagine the impact of, for
example, a hostile workplace on an individual victim. See Bratman, supra n. 3.
20 See e.g. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (requiring courts to weigh the free speech interests of
public employees against the interests of their employers in efficient operations in order to determine whether prior restraint
of an employee’s speech is permissible). See also Posner, supra n. 15, at 96–97 (“Emotion exerts a huge influence on how
people translate their experiences into beliefs, and so on the weights (critical to the balancing tests so widely used in
American law) that judges assign to the probable consequences of deciding a case one way or the other.”).
21 Justice Scalia describes the “reasonable man” test as “the most venerable totality of the circumstances test of them all.”
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1181 (1989). He suggests that, in a “rule of law”
system, when all of the available legal rules “have been exhausted and have yielded no answer, we call what remains to be
decided a question of fact . . . .” Id. But he notes that in some instances, including the determination of what constitutes a
“reasonable search” under the Fourth Amendment, courts have declared the application of the “reasonable man” test to be a
question of law for the court. But even he does not suggest that such tests can be eliminated from the body of the law altogether: “We will have totality of the circumstances tests and balancing modes of analysis with us forever—and for my sins,
I will probably write some of the opinions that use them. All I urge is that those modes of analysis be avoided where possible
. . . .” Id. at 1187.
22 Others have referred to this type of reasoning as “narrative rationality,” see Rideout, supra n. 17, at 56, or “narrative
reasoning,” see Edwards, supra n. 6, at 9.
23 Story, of course, is at its most fundamental level a pathos-based appeal. For the classical rhetoricians who are wondering
what happened to “ethos” in this model, think of the hydrogen bonds that hold the two strands of the helix together in a DNA
molecule and give the molecule its shape. In much the same way, ethos binds together the logos and story strands of a good
argument.
The “double helix” analogy also works well in a related context: how law is taught in law schools. The Carnegie
Foundation’s recent report, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law, identifies three “apprenticeships” that
all students should complete in order to become fully functioning professionals. The first apprenticeship, which the authors
designate as the “intellectual or cognitive” apprenticeship, embodies “analytical reasoning, argument, and research” (essentially a “logos strand”). The second apprenticeship “is to the forms of expert practice shared by competent practitioners. . . .
[S]tudents learn by taking part in simulated practice situations, as in case studies, or in actual clinical experience with real
clients.” (This is directly comparable to the “story” or “pathos” strand.) The third apprenticeship develops the “identity and
purpose, [and] introduces students to the purposes and attitudes that are guided by the values for which the professional
community is responsible.” (These would be the “ethos” bonds described above.) William M. Sullivan et al., Educating
Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law 28 (Jossey–Bass 2007).
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Many scholars and practitioners agree that briefs should tell a story.24
However, judges don’t unanimously agree. Some judges suggest that the
key to persuasion is good logical argumentation;25 others admit that telling
a good story is also helpful (although most suggest that the “story” is told
only in the fact section).26

II. The Persuasion Study
There is little empirical data on what persuades judges. One study reports
that judges prefer briefs that are “essays with a clear train of thought”
rather than “repositories of all the information a judge might want to
know.”27 Several other studies focus on what judges think of the quality of
the briefs they read.28 But no studies have attempted to systematically
measure the effect of story reasoning on a judge’s thought process.

24 See Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to
Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 Rutgers L.J. 459 (2001); Robert J. Kapelke, Some Random Thoughts on Brief Writing, 32
Colo. Law. 29, 29 (Jan. 2003) (“Good storytelling is a sound technique in brief writing, as in oral advocacy.”); see also Steve
Johansen, This Is Not the Whole Truth: The Ethics of Telling Stories to Clients, 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 961, 962 (2006); Carolyn Grose,
A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients’ Stories, 12 Clin. L. Rev. 329 (2006); Binny Miller, Telling Stories About Cases and
Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14 Geo. J. Legal. Ethics 1 (2000); Bret Rappaport, Tapping the Human Adaptive Origins of
Storytelling by Requiring Legal Writing Students to Read a Novel in Order to Appreciate How Character, Setting, Plot, Theme,
and Tone (CSPTT) Are as Important as IRAC, 25 Thomas M. Cooley L. Rev. 267 (2008). For a fuller listing of scholarly works
that discuss the use of narrative in legal persuasion, see Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion: An Annotated Bibliography, 6 J. ALWD
75, 77–79 (2009).
25 See text accompanying nn. 12 & 14, supra.
26 Aldisert, supra n. 14, at 168; Jacques L. Wiener, Ruminations from the Bench: Brief Writing and Oral Argument in the Fifth
Circuit, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 187, 194 (1995) (“Judges are human—even if some of us may not exhibit all of the qualities of that
species at all times—so you must demonstrate both why your client should win (the emotional element) and the proper legal
way that your client can win (the intellectual element).”); Patricia M. Wald, 19 Tips From 19 Years on the Appellate Bench, 1 J.
App. Prac. & Proc. 7, 11 (1999) (“Make the facts tell a story. The facts give the fix; spend time amassing them in a compelling
way for your side but do not omit the ones that go the other way.”); Alex Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff, 1992 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 325,
330 (1992) (“There is a quaint notion out there that facts don’t matter on appeal—that’s where you argue about the law; facts
are for sissies and trial courts. The truth is much different. The law doesn’t matter a bit, except as it applies to a particular set
of facts.”).
Judge Posner suggests that
since judges in our system are [occasional] legislators as well as adjudicators, lawyers should make a greater
effort to present facts to judges—not so much the facts of the case, the adjudicative facts, which most lawyers do
emphasize, but rather the background or general facts that influence a legislative decision (“legislative facts,” in
the conventional and in this instance useful terminology).
Posner, supra n. 15, at 118–119.
27 In the summer of 2000, Bryan Garner did a brief survey of 100 appellate judges, asking only if they thought an appellate
brief should be “an essay with a clear train of thought” or “a repository of all the information that a curious judge might want
to know about a case.” Of the 57 judges who responded, 49 (86%) preferred an “essay with a clear train of thought,” none
preferred the “repository of all information,” while 8 (14%) thought neither formulation was quite right. Bryan Garner, Judges
on Briefing: A National Survey, 8 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 1, 2 (2002).
28 See Kristen K. Robbins, The Inside Scoop: What Federal Judges Really Think About the Way Lawyers Write, 8 Leg. Writing
257, 260 (2002); Susan Hanley Kosse & David T. ButleRitchie, How Judges, Practitioners, and Legal Writing Teachers Assess
the Writing Skills of New Law Graduates: A Comparative Study, 53 J. Leg. Educ. 80, 82–87 (2003). For a study of how judges
and clerks read briefs, see James Stratman, Investigating Persuasive Processes in Legal Discourse, 17 Discourse Processes 1
(1994).
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In early 2009, I conducted a study in an attempt to fill that gap. I wrote
a series of test briefs in a hypothetical case and asked appellate judges,29
their law clerks, and appellate court staff attorneys, appellate lawyers, and
law professors to rate the briefs as to how persuasive they were. My
purpose (which I did not disclose to the test participants30) was to
measure whether a brief with a strong strand of story reasoning, woven in
with the logos-based argument, would be more persuasive than a “pure
logos” brief. I had two test hypotheses: (1) in general, a brief that included
a strand of story reasoning would be more persuasive than a pure logos
argument, and (2) this effect would be more pronounced if the brief-writer
had a “hard case” to make. That is to say, if existing law favored one side of
the case, the brief writer on that side could safely rely on a purely logosbased, or legal, argument, while the writer arguing for a change in the law
would have a greater chance of success by relying more heavily on the
pathos-based, or story, line of reasoning.
A. What is a “story”?
I first need to define exactly what I mean by “story.” There are many
potential definitions, most of which are too general or vague to be of much
analytical value.31 The definition that I used for this study is one crafted by
professional storyteller Kendall Haven:
Story: n.: A detailed, character-based narration of a character’s struggles
to overcome obstacles and reach an important goal.32

Haven contrasts “stories” with “information-based narratives,” which
he defines as narratives that “provide just the new essential information

29 I chose to limit my study to appellate courts, clerks and practitioners because that is the more controversial arena. It may
be more easily accepted that trial judges, who are asked to decide individual cases based upon specific individual characteristics, sometimes gleaned from direct observation of witnesses and parties in their courtrooms, may be more attentive to
personal characteristics and the “stories” of the persons who appear before them. Appellate judges, however, are more
removed from the disputes and the parties who inhabit those disputes, so that individual “stories” are less likely to be
important. See Aldisert, supra n. 14, at 5.
30 The instructions sent to all participants said only that “[t]his study is an attempt to measure empirically what technique or
techniques might lead to more persuasive writing.” Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the
Power of Story to Persuade (Survey Tool) (June 17, 2009) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1421494).
31 One typical “definition” is that “a story has a beginning, a middle, and an end.” Haven, supra n. 10, at 12. But that definition
is far too simplistic. By that definition, the sentence “I went to the store and bought a gallon of milk” is a complete “story,”
even though standing alone it is of no great interest to the reader and conveys little or no information that is useful.
32 Id. at 79. Other storytellers use a similar definition. See e.g. Annette Simmons, The Story Factor: Secrets of Influence from
the Art of Storytelling 31 (Basic Books 2001) (“A story is a narrative account of an event or events—true or fictional. The
difference between giving an example and telling a story is the addition of emotional content and added sensory details in the
telling. A story weaves detail, character, and events into a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.”).
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and assume the reader has adequate banks of relevant topical prior
knowledge to create context and meaning . . . .”33
What distinguishes “stories” from mere “information-based
narratives,” then, is that stories focus on characters, their goals, and their
struggles to achieve their goals. Stories need sufficient context to allow the
reader to fully see and understand why the participants in the story
behaved as they did, and what they were trying to accomplish in the face
of various obstacles. The word “story,” therefore, refers to a method of
structuring information in a form that a reader will find engaging.34
The need to provide context, however, leaves the writer of an
appellate brief in a quandary. Many jurists who have written about what
they like to see in briefs emphasize concision.35 Justice Antonin Scalia and
author Bryan Garner urge caution in including “sympathetic facts that are
legally irrelevant.”36 Many appellate court rules require the statement of
facts section of an appellate brief to include “relevant facts,” perhaps
excluding by implication legally irrelevant facts.37 But the context
necessary to create a complete story (e.g., the details needed to develop
the litigants’ character and goals) frequently requires the inclusion of
background details that are legally irrelevant, yet necessary for the reader
to completely understand what is going on.38 How can an attorney
attempting to tell the client’s story include such detail without annoying
the court, or (even worse) risking a sanction for violating the applicable
rules of appellate procedure?

33 Haven, supra n. 10, at 79. Using these definitions, the sentence “I went to the store and bought a gallon of milk” is an information-based narrative rather than a story because it provides no information about the actor, the struggle of the actor, or the
actor’s goals. To be a complete story, much more context about the actor’s struggle to obtain milk, and why he needed it,
would be necessary.
34 Id. at 15.
35Aldisert, supra n. 14, at 25–28 and 234–235 (collecting comments from appellate judges emphasizing concision); Scalia &
Garner, supra n. 12, at 23–25; see also Kosse & ButleRitchie, supra n. 28, at 85 (noting that their survey of state and federal
judges, and other groups, revealed that judges rank clarity and concision as the two most essential elements of good legal
writing).
36Scalia & Garner, supra n. 12, at 94.
37See e.g. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(7); Ind. R. App. P. 46 (A)(6) (requiring the Statement of the Facts to “describe the facts relevant
to the issues presented for review”); In Interest of Michael G., 213 Wis. 2d 124 n. 1, 570 N.W. 2d 253 (Table) (Wis. App. 1997)
(in a state with a rule identical to Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(7), criticizing the state’s brief for including background facts that were
not legally relevant to the narrow issue before the court).
38 Storyteller Annette Simmons points out that facts which some persons might consider “irrelevant details” may be highly
useful because of their ability to trigger emotional reactions in the listener. “Just because we cannot draw a linear connection
of relevance does not mean that a sensory detail is not connected in a nonlinear way to choices we make.” Simmons, supra n.
32, at 96.
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B. The test briefs
For my study, I attempted to write two “information-based narratives”
(which I will refer to below as the “logos briefs”) and two “story briefs.”
Each pair of briefs addressed opposite sides of a hypothetical case in a
fictional jurisdiction. Writing these briefs proved to be the most difficult
part of this project.39
Because one of my hypotheses for this study was that stories would
have more impact in a case where the legal support for one side is weak,
the fictional case I created involved a hard case: A county in the fictional
state of West Dakota had adopted (by voter referendum) an ordinance
purporting to prohibit corporations from seeking to influence local
government officials, on the theory that corporations are not “persons”
protected by either the United States or West Dakota Bill of Rights. The
corporate defendant, a retail hardware store, had the “easy case” to make
(reliance on the doctrine of stare decisis and a 130-year-old Supreme
Court precedent), while the county had a much harder case to make
(seeking to overturn that long-settled principle of law).40
The logos briefs were intentionally spare; they provided just the
legally relevant facts (the “new essential information”) and focused tightly
on the legal precedents and logical reasoning (the “relevant topical prior
knowledge”). For example, the statement of the case in the logos briefs for
both the hardware store and the county recited these bare but legally
relevant facts: that the county voters had adopted Proposition 3 (the
measure which purported to deprive corporations of the right to influence
government officials through the expenditure of corporate funds); that the
hardware store had sought a rezoning for a parcel of land; that it had
purchased a full-page advertisement in the local newspaper seeking to
gain popular support among the local citizens for the rezoning request;
that the rezoning request had been denied; and that because the

39 The test briefs are available at Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of Story to
Persuade (Test Briefs) (June 18, 2009) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1421900). The county’s “logos” brief is cited as
Respondent Brief 1; the county’s “story” brief as Respondent Brief 2. Similarly, the corporation’s “logos” brief is cited as
Petitioner Brief 1, and the corporation’s “story” brief as Petitioner Brief 2.
Professors Ruth Anne Robbins and Richard Neumann provided very helpful comments on the test briefs.
40 Some may dispute that this scenario is really a “hard case” at all, since the rules of stare decisis are well settled and the legal
rule at issue in this case, the doctrine of “corporate personhood,” is universal and long-standing. However, such analysis
reflects what I would call “law-oriented thinking” since it proceeds from an assumption that the law is primary and correct
and only needs to be applied to specific facts. In terms of “fact-oriented thinking,” however, the hypothetical scenario is a
hard case because the party on the short end of the law, the county representing the local residents of Old Orleans, seems to
have a valid interest in preserving the character of their home town, but has to fight an uphill battle against well-financed
adversaries.
For examples of Supreme Court briefs and opinions that counter the assumption that corporations are “persons” who
“speak,” see Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions
on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 Mercer L. Rev. 949 (2007) and Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation
Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ALWD 169 (2004).
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advertisement violated the ordinance, the county had levied a fine against
the hardware store as specified in the remedial provisions of Proposition
3. While the store’s and the county’s briefs varied some of the word
choices, sentence structures and selection of the facts in order to put more
emphasis on the facts each side felt were more helpful to their sides,41 the
end result was that the statements of facts in the two logos briefs were
pretty similar.
The fact sections of the story briefs, however, were very different. In
both briefs, I spent some time developing a “baseline” for the story: a
satisfying pre-existing condition that was lost when the controversy
arose.42 For example, the county’s brief described the county seat (the
locale for the zoning controversy) as an emerging artistic community:
Almost all of the remaining manufacturing or industrial jobs in the
region are located within the Borough of Old Orleans, in an industrial
park on the southeast side of the borough. Due to the recent decline in
manufacturing jobs, however, more than one third of the structures in
that park are now vacant and are deteriorating. The downtown
commercial district remains relatively vibrant, however. About ten years
ago, there had been a noticeable decline in commercial activity
downtown, with numerous vacant storefronts appearing. In the past
three or four years, many of those vacant storefronts have been replaced
with art galleries, craft shops, restaurants, or other stores catering to
tourists and the growing artist community.43

Note that this description, while delivered in facially neutral language
(i.e., the description does not include intensifiers or overblown rhetoric),
evokes an image of a pleasant little village, struggling to re-invent itself in
the face of a declining industrial base.44 It not only provides a glimpse of
what the county is trying to protect, but subtly suggests that this vision is
worth protecting. The “important goal” for the protagonist (the county) is
set up.
41 For example, the brief for the store described the penalty imposed by the District Attorney as “ten times the cost of the
advertisement,” while the brief for the county described the penalty as “the fine required by section 5 of Proposition 3.”
42 Amsterdam & Bruner describe the arc of a well-crafted plot as having five stages: (1) an initial condition of tranquility
which (2) is disrupted by some “Trouble,” leading to (3) efforts to remediate the Trouble, (4) so that the original condition of
tranquility can be restored, or a new condition of tranquility is created, (5) ending with some coda or moral of the story.
Amsterdam & Bruner, supra n. 7, at 113–114. Others have described the arc of a plot as (1) introduction/exposition
(describing the initial condition of stasis), (2) a complicating incident and rising action (the conflict arises), (3) a climax (at
which point the protagonist is at maximum peril), (4) resolution/falling action (in which the complication is resolved), and (5)
the denouement. See e.g. Chestek, supra n. 16, at 147.
43 Respt. Br. 2, at 3 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1421900).
44 Does this excerpt conjure up an image of a town that you know? At the LWI Writer’s Workshop in Welches, Oregon in
July 2009, I asked various participants to read this passage and see if it evoked the image of any real town they knew. All
participants were able to name real places they saw in their heads; two participants who were from the same state even came
up with the very same small town.
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The “obstacle” then appears:
In early 2007, BiggBox Lumber Company acquired an option to
purchase a vacant tract of land in Wetmarsh Township, about five miles
south of the downtown area of Old Orleans. The land is near an interchange of Highway 81, the main highway into the Lost River Recreation
Area. Since the land is currently zoned AR-1 Agricultural, BiggBox
applied to the township zoning board for a rezoning of the property to C1 Commercial.
The Old Orleans Industrial Development Agency, which has been
in charge of the efforts to redevelop the vacant sawmill site in the
borough, then approached BiggBox in an attempt to show BiggBox that
the site was large enough and needed no rezoning in order to accommodate BiggBox’s needs. It also put together a favorable tax-free
financing package and other incentives hoping to convince BiggBox to
locate within the borough. However, BiggBox rejected these overtures
and pursued its strategy to obtain a rezoning of the Wetmarsh property.
Part of its strategy in seeking this goal was to purchase a full-page ad in
the Old Orleans Gazette, the weekly newspaper in the region, seeking to
persuade both the local residents and the Wetmarsh Township officials
that the rezoning would be in the best economic interest of the
township.45

In terms of plot development,46 the newspaper advertisement
constitutes the “complicating incident” that upsets the pre-existing
condition of stasis and gives rise to the conflict that drives the story
forward. Note that the town is portrayed in a favorable light (for example,
by proposing a reasonable alternative to the hardware store that the town
believed would satisfy the goals of both parties). Conversely, the hardware
store is subtly portrayed negatively, as “rejecting” the reasonable
compromise proposed by the town and intentionally violating the County
ordinance by appealing directly to the town’s residents. Yet once again the
language is understated and free from intensifiers or overblown rhetoric;
the reader is left to imagine the scene that the writer intends to portray.
The story brief for the hardware store uses similar techniques to
create a favorable image. It also sets up a “baseline” condition of stasis:
BiggBox Lumber Co., Inc., is the nation’s fourth largest retail outlet
for hardware and home improvement supplies. Its business model is to
locate primarily in smaller communities which are not served by either

45 Respt. Br. 2, at 3–4 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1421900).
46 See Chestek, supra n. 16, at 147–150.
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of the two largest companies, Home Depot and Lowe’s. In order to
remain price competitive in the home improvement market, its
operating margins are somewhat smaller than those of its larger
competitors.
BiggBox operates three stores in West Dakota, and has filed all of
the necessary registration statements to allow it to do business within the
state. Early in 2007, BiggBox identified Old Orleans and the Lost River
Valley area of West Dakota as a market not served by either Home Depot
or Lowe’s, but large enough to support a BiggBox retail store.47

Once again, an image is created: a small (by comparison) company
trying to eke out a living in smaller communities that the “big boys”
ignore, thus providing a valuable service to an underserved community.
The hardware store then subtly attempts to portray itself as the
reasonable party in the dispute, and the town as an officious intermeddler.
After describing its business model in the language quoted above, the
store wrote:
[BiggBox] conducted a market study and determined that the best
location for a new store would be a vacant parcel of land near the interchange of Highway 81 and County Road BB, several miles outside of the
town of Old Orleans. It chose that location because its store would be
visible from Highway 81, which is the main route into the Lost River
Recreation Area. The fact that the land was relatively flat and undeveloped would also reduce the cost of improving the land so as to
support a standard BiggBox retail outlet.
BiggBox thereafter obtained an option to purchase the land, subject
to the approval of the Wetmarsh Township Supervisors to rezone the
land from agricultural to commercial. However, soon after BiggBox filed
its rezoning application, representatives of the Old Orleans Area
Industrial Development Agency contacted BiggBox, seeking to persuade
BiggBox to abandon the Wetmarsh Township location and locate,
instead, in a vacant sawmill within the Borough of Old Orleans. It offered
various tax and financing incentives in order to encourage BiggBox to
locate in the borough. BiggBox considered the Agency’s proposal but
ultimately rejected it, because it would have increased the cost of development of the store and because the location in the Borough of Old
Orleans was not as visible nor as easily accessible from major thoroughfares.48

47 Petr. Br. 2, at 1 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1421900).
48 Petr. Br. 2, at 1–2 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1421900).
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The story briefs thus provided a great deal more context about how
the controversy arose (both clients’ “struggles”) and what both clients
hoped to achieve (their “goals”). The character of each client was thus
developed, in an effort to build sympathy in the reader’s mind toward each
client. The conflict became more vivid; the goal of each client was more
visible.
Another central element of a story is the “theme.”49 While most
appellate brief writing texts recommend choosing a clear theme, in
practice much of this advice translates to “present a clear legal theory.” For
example, Justice Scalia and Garner write that an appellate brief “must form
a coherent whole.” They recommend that the brief be designed “to bring
out your theory of the case and your principal themes,”50 but they also
recommend strongly that the advocate “think syllogistically.”51
Scalia and Garner’s formulation suggests that the “theory of the case”
and the “theme” are synonyms, or at least closely related. However, when
one analyzes persuasion according to the double-helix “DNA model,”
“theory of the case” and “theme” become distinct. The “theory of the case”
equates to the “legal theory”: the logical, law-based reason why a
particular result is required (i.e., the logos strand). In a story strand of
reasoning, however, the emotional core (or pathos-based) reason why a
court should want to rule in a specific client’s favor can be described as the
“theme” of that case. A good brief, which fully develops both the logical
and the story strands of reasoning, should therefore include both a
coherent, logical “theory of the case” and an emotionally satisfying
“theme.”
Consider how this works in the test briefs. The store’s “theory of the
case” was that the doctrine of stare decisis compelled the lower courts to
adhere to the precedents that establish the legal personhood of corporations, while the county’s legal theory was that precedents can be
overruled when specified standards suggest the continued social utility of
a legal rule is questionable. These are both appeals to the logical brain
(although the “soft” standards for when changed circumstances are
sufficient to allow precedent to be overruled may require some story
reasoning).

49 See Chestek, supra n. 16, at 146–147.
50 Scalia & Garner, supra n. 12, at 59.
51 Id. at 41. Scalia & Garner do emphasize the importance of “knowing your case” and advise the brief writer not to “underestimate the importance of the facts.” Id. at 8–9. However, they clarify that the facts are important not for their own sake, but
only as fodder for applying legal reasoning: “To be sure, you will be arguing to the court about the law, but what law applies—
what cases are in point, and what cases can be distinguished—depends ultimately on the facts of your case.” Id.
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Themes, however, work at a different level; they appeal to the
emotional brain. The theme of a story brief should evoke an emotional
response from the reader. The theme should explain the motivations of the
characters, and give the reader a reason to respect and “root for” those
characters.52 Thus, in addition to the legal theories (the propriety, or not,
of adhering to precedent in this case), I set about to include a strong
theme in both of the story briefs.53
In thinking about the theme for the story briefs, I used the concept of
“deep frames” described by cognitive scientist George Lakoff. Lakoff
describes “deep frames” as “moral and political principles that are so deep
they are part of your very identity. . . .” As a result, “the deep frames are the
ones that structure how you view the world.”54 Deep frames can be stated
in just a few words, and should evoke a predictable response from the
listener. For example, Lakoff describes the word “freedom” as a deep
frame. At the heart of every deep frame is what he calls an “uncontested
idea”; in his example, the idea is that “freedom” is good and is something
all people long for.55 Deep frames work at an almost unconscious level,56
and often can trump facts.57
In choosing themes for the two story briefs, I sought to identify deep
frames that would connect with fundamental and nearly universal values
that appellate judges were likely to hold. For the brief on behalf of the
hardware store, therefore, I chose the deep frame of the free market: the
free enterprise system works best when market actors are free to pursue
their economic best interests with the minimum of government inter-

52 Professor Ruth Anne Robbins proposes that brief writers should attempt to cast their clients, the protagonists in the
stories that a lawyer needs to tell, as heroes, and she suggests various archetypal roles that the clients could fulfill. Ruth Anne
Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story Using the Characters and Paradigm of the
Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 Seattle U. L. Rev. 767 (2006).
53 Since I view “theme” as the heart of story reasoning, the logos briefs did not include a strong theme. This was one of the
ways in which I sought to isolate the variable of story in the two briefs participants were asked to evaluate.
54 Lakoff, supra n. 4, at 12.
55 Id. at 14. Storyteller Annette Simmons makes the same point when she suggests that storytellers “tap into the listener’s
momentum” by tapping “into one of the core human needs that we all share.” Simmons, supra n. 32, at 110.
56 Professor Linda Berger points out that “[b]ecause . . . stories shape our recognition of the problem, they control the
directions we tend to follow in solving it. So, for instance, when a father is described as a ‘deadbeat dad,’ the Trouble driving
the plot can be overcome by requiring him to pay his debt and meet his financial obligations, rather than by requiring him to
take responsibility for parenting his children . . . .” Berger, supra n. 17, at 282. In her example, the term “deadbeat dad” is a
“deep frame” through which the reader is led to a desired emotional response.
57 “Suppose a fact is inconsistent with the frames and metaphors in your brain that define common sense. Then the frame or
metaphor will stay, and the fact will be ignored. For facts to make sense they must fit existing frames and metaphors in the
brain.” Lakoff, supra n. 4, at 13. As just one example, nearly three years after former President Bush admitted that there was
no link between Saddam Hussein and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, three independent polls showed that
between 31 and 46% of all respondents still believed there was such a link. Angus Reid Global Monitor, Some Americans Still
Link Hussein to 9/11, http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/13081 (Sept. 9, 2006). This perception is likely because the link
fit people’s “deep frame” that Hussein was involved, a frame created during the run-up to the Iraq war by President Bush and
others who frequently mentioned 9/11 and Hussein in close proximity to each other.
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ference. For the brief on behalf of the county, the deep frame was
Americana: small towns in America should be free to choose for themselves what their community looks like and how it functions. (Both
frames, of course, rely on the “uncontested core” that freedom is good.)
In practice, I suspect that most attorneys would write briefs that are
something more than pure information-based narratives and which
include some elements of story. But to accurately measure the persuasive
effect of the story line, I had to isolate the variable of story-based
reasoning as much as possible. Both the logos briefs and the story briefs
were therefore somewhat exaggerated versions of the types of briefs
described above.58 For example, all four briefs used the same neutral
Statement of the Issue.59 Also, in an effort to make sure that the “logos
strand” in each brief was functionally the same as the corresponding story
brief (thereby isolating the “story argument” as the only variable), every
case cited in the story brief was also discussed in the logos brief on that
side of the case.60 Each logos/story pair of briefs made the same basic legal
arguments, although in some cases the arguments were rearranged or
stated differently in the story briefs in order to fit the storyline. For
example, both briefs for the hardware store began by citing numerous
cases which held that corporations were “persons” entitled to the free
speech protections of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, then argued that no reason existed to overturn that
precedent. Both briefs concluded with an argument that a “self determination clause” of the West Dakota constitution did not give humans
greater rights than corporations; however, the story brief provided additional context for this argument by describing the history surrounding the
adoption of that provision. The story brief argued that since the self-determination clause was adopted long after several of the previously cited
cases had held that corporations were protected “persons,” the word
“people” in the clause should be construed to include corporations.61

58 I should add here that, within the constraints of attempting to cleanly separate “logos” from “story,” I attempted to write
the best briefs I could on each side of the case.
59 All four briefs used this statement of the issue:
The question certified by this Court is as follows: “Whether Proposition 3, adopted by the voters of
Independence County, unconstitutionally deprives corporations of protectable rights under either the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, § 6 of the West Dakota Constitution.”
See Chestek, supra n. 39, for the text of the briefs.
60 Both of the logos briefs cited a few more cases than the corresponding story briefs, but all of the major cases relied upon
in the logos briefs were also discussed in the story briefs.
61 See Petr. Br. 2, at 8–9 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1421900).
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To minimize the reading that participants would have to complete (in
an effort to maximize participation in the study), no appendix or record
was included; thus, none of the four briefs included citations to the record.
C. The test subjects
Next, I had to recruit participants to my study.
While the principal purpose for this study was to measure the
persuasive effect of stories on appellate judges, I was also interested to see
if different groups would react in different ways to these briefs. Thus, I
recruited not only appellate judges, but appellate law clerks, appellate
court staff attorneys, practicing appellate lawyers, and legal writing
professors to participate in the study.62 Initially, 175 participants signed
up for the study. My research assistant then randomly assigned
each participant to review a pair of briefs for the Petitioner or the
Respondent.63
Ultimately, 95 participants read the briefs and completed the online
survey tool:
Table 1: Survey Participants
Category

Number participating

Appellate judges

13

Appellate law clerks

12

Appellate court staff attorneys

8

Appellate practitioners

37

Law professors

25
TOTAL 95

62 Judicial participants throughout the country were invited to participate in the survey through an e-mail sent by the Hon.
Frank Sullivan of the Indiana Supreme Court, who was serving as chairman of the American Bar Association’s Appellate
Judges Conference at the time of the study. Appellate practitioners were invited to participate in the study through a similar
e-mail sent to members of the ABA’s Appellate Practice Committee. Law professors were invited to participate through emails sent to national listservs for legal writing professors and clinical law professors, as well as a more general listserv for all
law professors. (The only law professors who participated, however, were legal writing professors and a few professors who
teach both legal writing and live client clinics.) None of the e-mails disclosed the test variable; the announcement seeking
participants for this study said:
The 2008 Persuasion Study will ask volunteer appellate judges, appellate law clerks, appellate practitioners
and legal writing professors to review two short, one-issue briefs, both arguing the same side of a fictional case
in a fictional jurisdiction. The two briefs will be carefully written to make the best possible argument available,
but using different persuasive approaches to the case. Participants will then be asked to select which of the two
briefs they found more persuasive.
E-mail from Hon. Frank Sullivan to participants announcing 2008 Persuasion Study (copy on file with the author).
63 Because we had to send the test materials out to each participant, my research assistant handled all of these mailings. She
was instructed not to disclose to me, and has not disclosed to me, the identity of any participant. A copy of the instructions
she sent to participants and the survey questions can be found at Chestek, supra n. 30.
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The online survey gathered some basic demographic information
about the participants (including gender, the job held by the participant,
years of experience in that job, and geographic region). Participants were
assigned a random participant number and filled out the online survey
using only that number, in order to preserve anonymity of responses.64
D. The survey questions
The heart of the online survey was a series of simple questions. First,
participants were asked, “Which of the two briefs you read was more
persuasive for the position being advocated?”65 Participants were then
asked to score, on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “not very persuasive” and
5 being “very persuasive”), the overall brief, the recitation of the facts, and
the argument section.66
All participants were sent, by e-mail, the logos and the story briefs on
a randomly assigned side of the case. At first, this choice may seem odd,
since judges are not typically asked to review two briefs on the same side
of a single case. Judges are trained to review briefs from opposing parties
and render a judgment based on the quality of the legal arguments made.
However, since I had chosen a “hard case” as the subject of this study, I
feared that asking the participants to judge briefs on opposite sides of the
case would inevitably pollute the data by injecting the merits of the case
into the scoring process. Because I was attempting to isolate the story
variable, I did not want the participants to base their scoring in any way on
which side of the case had the better argument on the law.67
The survey went live at the end of January 2009 with the electronic
delivery of the test briefs and instructions to all 175 participants. Data
collection continued through March.

III. Survey Results
In some respects, the data revealed what I expected, but there were a
few surprises as well. I was not surprised to learn that most readers,
including judges, tended to prefer the story briefs; however, I was

64 The study was “double blind,” in that not only were the names of the participants hidden from me, I did not identify myself
to participants as the principal investigator. Participants were recruited through a SurveyMonkey website that identified me
only as a “professor at a major Midwestern university.”
65 Participants in all categories (judges, clerks, practitioners, and professors) were asked the same question. The “writers”
(professors and practitioners) were not asked to predict which brief they thought the “readers” (judges and clerks) might
prefer.
66 The survey questions can be found at Chestek, supra n. 30.
67 See infra note 69 and accompanying text for further discussion of this question.

JAWLD_typeset_v18-PRF-04

6/25/10

1:01 PM

Page 19

19

JUDGING BY THE NUMBERS

surprised to learn that this preference appeared to become stronger the
longer a particular participant had held his or her job.
A. Overall results
My first hypothesis was that the story brief would prove to be more
persuasive than the pure logos brief. The overall data suggest that
hypothesis is correct:
Table 2: All Participants
Brief

More persuasive (n)

%

Logos brief

29

30.5%

Story brief

61

64.2%

Neither

5

5.3%

TOTAL

95

100%

My second hypothesis was that the story brief would have a greater
impact on the Respondent side of the case, since the law favored
Petitioner. Table 3 breaks down the results between Petitioner and
Respondent briefs.
Table 3: Petitioner vs. Respondent
Brief

More persuasive (n)

%

Respondent briefs
Logos brief

16

33.3%

Story brief

30

62.5%

Neither

2

4.2%

TOTAL

48

100%

Logos brief

13

27.7%

Story brief

31

66.0%

Neither

3

6.4%

TOTAL

47

100%

Petitioner briefs

Given the sample size, these results likely fall within the margin of
error for this study. In short, my second test hypothesis appears to have
been disproven; there was no significant difference between the
Respondent briefs and the Petitioner briefs. Storytelling seems to work in
all cases, not just hard ones.
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B. Differences by job function
One of the main purposes of this study was to determine, if possible,
whether stories persuaded the primary audience for briefs: appellate
judges.
Unfortunately, while 23 appellate judges initially registered for the
study, only 13 ultimately read the briefs and completed the study. Thus, in
an effort to get a larger sample, I initially combined the categories of
appellate judges, appellate court staff attorneys, and appellate law clerks
into a category of “readers of briefs.” I then compared those results with
“writers of briefs” (the appellate practitioners), and the law professor
category. These results are displayed in Table 4.
Table 4: Responses by Participant Group
Brief

“Readers”

“Writers”

Law Profs.

Logos

12 36.4%

8

Story

19 57.6%

27 73.0%

15 60.0%

Neither

2

2

1

Total

33

6.1%

21.6%

9

5.4%

37

36.0%
4.0%

25

In this grouping, it appeared that the law professors reacted to story
in almost exactly the same way that the readers group did. Upon
reflection, however, I wondered if the readers group was as homogeneous
as I thought. I therefore did another chart, breaking the readers group
down into its constituent parts. The results of that analysis are shown in
Table 5.
Table 5: Responses by Participant Type
Brief

Appellate
Judges

Logos

4 30.8%

Law
Clerks
6 50.0%

Staff
Attorneys

Practitioners

Law
Professors

2 25.0%

8

21.6%

9 36.0%

Story

7 53.8%

6 50.0%

6 75.0%

27 73.0%

15 60.0%

Neither

2 15.4%

0 0.0%

0 0.0%

2

1 4.0%

Total

13

12

8

37

5.4%

25

The most interesting difference revealed in Table 5 is the wide
discrepancy between law clerks and other “readers” as to how persuasive
the logos brief was to them. I will explore this finding in more detail in
Part V-B infra.
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C. Gender differences
I was also curious to see if there was any gender-based difference in the
responses. Stereotypically, women are perceived to be more emotional;
would they respond to the story brief in greater numbers than the male
participants? It appears that gender made absolutely no difference; men
and women reacted to the briefs in virtually identical ways. Table 6
analyzes all participants by gender.
Table 6: Gender Differences
Brief

More persuasive (n)

%

Male participants (n=56)
Logos Brief

17

30.4%

Story Brief

36

64.3%

Neither

3

5.4%

Logos Brief

12

30.8%

Story Brief

25

64.1%

Neither

2

5.2%

Female participants (n=39)

D. Job longevity
One of the demographic questions asked participants how long they had
held their current job. I was curious to see if participants got more jaded
over time, favoring pure logic over the “softer” story briefs. Surprisingly, I
found the opposite to be true. It appears that the longer one works in a
particular job, the more the story of the case is persuasive. Table 7 breaks
down the responses by the number of years each participant had held his
or her current job.
Table 7: Responses by Experience in Job
Brief

0–4 yrs.

5–9 yrs.

10–14 yrs.

15–19 yrs.

20–24 yrs.

25+ yrs.

Logos

11 45.8%

5 33.3%

4

26.7%

1

10.0%

6 35.3%

2 14.3%

Story

13 54.2%

9 60.0%

9

60.0%

9

90.0%

10 58.8%

11 78.6%

Neither 0 0.0%

1 6.7%

2

13.3%

0

0.0%

1 5.9%

1 7.1%

TOTAL

15

15

17

14

24

10
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Grouping the two ends of the spectrum together reveals an interesting
pattern:
Table 8: Responses by Experience Groups
Brief

More persuasive (n)

%

0–9 years’ experience (n = 39)
Logos brief

16

41.0%

Story brief

22

56.4%

Neither

1

2.6%

Logos brief

9

22.0%

Story brief

30

73.2%

Neither

2

4.9%

15+ years’ experience (n = 41)

I will also explore this finding in greater detail in part V–B, below.

IV. How Reliable Are the Data?
Before we can evaluate the data, several questions need to be addressed.
First, does the survey tool really measure what it claims to measure?
Second, was the test itself free from bias? Third, was the sample collected
representative of the universe the test sought to study?
A. Does the survey tool accurately measure
the intended variable?
Do the test briefs in this study really measure the persuasive impact of
story reasoning? Given the complexity of the effect sought to be measured
(what is “persuasive”), it is probably impossible for the briefs, which were
themselves complex documents, to cleanly separate “story” from “logic.”
But many of the comments left by the survey participants in the final,
open-ended “comment” field suggest that the participants were in fact
reacting to that variable (or, at least, were reacting to the things I intentionally did to try to isolate those two strands).
The most common theme throughout the responses was that the
background information, or context, either distracted the reader or (more
often) helped the reader gain perspective on the legal question presented
to the court. (The story of the case, of course, is primarily told through
those background details; stated otherwise, the context tells the story.)
Here is a sampling of some of those comments:
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From participants favoring the story brief
• [The story brief ] worked much better because it provided context to the
legal arguments.
• The [story] brief was more persuasive because it provided a far better
factual context within which to consider the legal arguments.
• [The logos brief ] was reasoned well, but it included no persuasive principles, like ethos and pathos. [The story brief ] made the reader aware of
the Petitioner’s business and, despite being a large corporation,
personified it and made the reader sympathize with it.
• The author of [the story brief ] provided a much stronger statement of
facts by setting the dispute in a broader context and portraying
opponents as not driven by any principle. The statement of facts in [the
logos brief ], although accurate, seemed to forgo the opportunity to
define the field on which the parties would battle and, by doing so,
essentially allowed the opposing party to do the defining.
• The recitation of facts in [the story brief ] helped tremendously in
placing petitioner’s argument in context.
• [The logos brief ] did not personalize the situation for the corporation;
[the story brief ] did that well. By the end of the facts section, I was predisposed to favor the corporation. . . . [The logos brief ] did not seem to
have any sense of the big picture. [The story brief ] took a much more
expansive view and, thus, was more eloquent in every section.
• [The story brief ] told a better story, framing the issue in a more colorful
way, thus providing better context for the dispute. It gave more detailed
information and background, which gave me the context I needed.
• I thought the two briefs were interesting representatives of opposite
ends of a spectrum. [The logos brief ] lacked any sort of context, while
[the story brief ] had too much. A happy medium would have been
better.
• [The logos brief ] did not put the issues in context. [The story brief ]
provided a story that supported the legal arguments.

From participants favoring the logos brief
• [The story brief ] included irrelevant facts in the facts section, which
hurts its credibility. Its introduction section was too argumentative and
not adequately focused on the issue at hand.

23
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• [The logos brief ] was cut-to-the-chase and no-nonsense with the
argument stated clearly. [The story brief ] used more flowery language. .
..
• I found the length and level of detail of the fact section in [the story
brief ] to be annoying because it seemed that the case should be decided
on the law, not the facts. Indeed, the argument section in [the story
brief ] didn’t appear to use a lot of the facts provided, confirming that
there [sic] inclusion was unnecessary.
• The goal of appellate courts is to consider and to decide specific
questions of law. [The story brief ] speaks in very expansive terms of the
general issues in this case, including environmental issues, and in so
doing distracts from the specific issue of law that is to be argued.
• The almost wholly irrelevant statement of facts, and consistent[ly]
irrelevant rhetoric of [the story brief ] was off-putting. It was realistically
representative of briefs that obscure questions of law under emotional
grandstanding.[The logos brief ] was concise and to the point. [The
story brief ] seemed to bury the material facts and legal argument in
extraneous background facts, which I found ineffective and distracting.
These comments seem to confirm that many readers were in fact
reacting to the story elements I intentionally included in the story briefs.
B. Were the test briefs unintentionally biased in favor of story?
This question is complex and perhaps not susceptible to a definitive
answer. As I noted above, in writing the test briefs I tried to create a fair
test; that is, I attempted to write the best briefs I could by sticking
faithfully to the definitions of “story” and “information-based narrative”
described above.68
One way of determining whether there was a built-in, unintentional
bias in the test would be to look at the numerical scores assigned to the
briefs by the participants. If the logos briefs were of significantly lower
quality, then those numerical scores would likely be significantly lower
than the scores of the story briefs.
Participants were asked to score each brief on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1
being “not very persuasive” and 5 being “very persuasive.” Table 9 shows
the average overall scores for each pair of briefs, as well as a combined
total.

68 See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
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Table 9: Average Overall Brief Scores
Brief

Petitioner

Respondent

Both

Logos

3.44

2.65

3.05

Story

4.10

3.34

3.73

Diff.

0.66

0.69

0.68

As this table demonstrates, the average difference in score between
the logos and story briefs was less than a single point. The combined score
for all logos briefs was 3.05, or “neutral” on the five-point scale; had the
survey participants thought the briefs to be badly written or useless, one
would have expected an average score below 3 for the logos briefs.69
Another way of looking at this would be to measure the relative
strength of the reactions to the briefs by those who preferred the logos
brief compared with those who preferred the story brief. Table 10
compares these reactions:
Table 10: Average Brief Scores by Preference
Brief

Preferred Logos

Preferred Story

Logos

4.04

2.62

Story

2.87

4.18

Diff.

1.17

1.56

It appears that a participant’s strength of preference was comparable
regardless of whether one preferred the logos or the story brief, although
those who preferred the story brief seemed to have a slightly stronger preference than those who preferred logos. But most significantly, the
participants who indicated a preference for one of the briefs rated their
favored brief, on average, just above 4, and the difference between those
preferences (4.04 compared to 4.18) was small. If there had been an unintentional bias built into the test, one might have expected the quality
ranking of the logos briefs to be significantly lower than that of the story
briefs.
It is also instructive to examine individual responses to each pair of
briefs. I examined each survey response and calculated the absolute value

69 The fact that the Respondent briefs were scored significantly lower than the Petitioner pair likely reflects the fact that the
Respondent had the “hard case” to make; that is to say, participants felt the briefs attempting to enforce stare decisis were
more persuasive than the briefs seeking to overturn long-standing precedent. This seems to bear out my fear, discussed in the
text accompanying supra note 67, that asking participants to evaluate matched pairs of petitioner and respondent briefs
would have injected the merits of the case as an uncontrolled variable in the readers’ evaluations.
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of the difference in scores between the two briefs the participant read. By
doing so, I sought to determine the strength of each individual
participant’s reaction to the briefs. Because the scoring scale was a range
from 1 to 5, the highest possible differential (4) would suggest that the
participant had a very strong preference for one brief over the other, while
the lowest possible differential (0) would indicate that the participant had
no preference between the two briefs. The median absolute value of the
differential between the two briefs proved to be 1, regardless of whether
the participant was reviewing the Petitioner or Respondent pair. This
analysis also indicates that most participants felt the two briefs were fairly
even, and their preferences for one or the other were not strong.70
While none of this proves that the test instrument was unbiased, the
consistency of the scoring of the Petitioner and Respondent briefs, as well
as the relatively weak preferences expressed for one brief over the other,
gives me some confidence that the briefs did accomplish the goal of
presenting the best briefs possible within the design parameters.
C. Was the participant sample representative?
Because the study relied on self-selected volunteers, another possible
objection might be that the pool of participants was unrepresentative. If
the pool was unrepresentative, the question then arises whether the skew
in the sample introduced some sort of bias in the results.
It is impossible to determine whether a sample is representative of the
entire universe of possible test subjects without knowing the demographic
makeup of that universe. And, in this case, it is difficult to know much
about that universe. Because the main focus of the study was how
appellate judges reacted to the two different briefs, I asked my research
assistant to visit the websites of all of the appellate courts in all 50 states
and for all federal appeals courts. She was able to gather the names,
locations, and (in most cases) the genders of the “universe” comprising all
appellate court judges or justices in the United States. She counted 1,480
appellate judges in all state and federal appellate courts as of June 2008.
Her findings are reported in Table 11:

70 Only one participant out of 95 rated one brief as a “1” and the other as a “5” (creating the maximum differential of 4).
Fifty-four of the 95 participants rated the difference between the two briefs as either zero or 1.
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Table 11: Demographic Makeup of U.S. Appellate Courts 71
Criterion

(n) Judges % of Total

Gender
Male

985

66.6%

Female

495

33.4%

1480

100%

248

16.8%

335

22.6%

TOTAL
Regional Distribution
Region 1(Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virgin Islands)
Region 2 (Alabama, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,

Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia)
Region 3 (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, 338

22.8%

Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin)
Region 4 (Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,

295

19.9%

264

17.8%

New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah)
Region 5 (Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho,

Montana, Nevada, Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, Washington, Wyoming)
TOTAL

1480

100%

This chart shows the number of judges in each category, as well as the
percentage that number represents of the whole of each category. If the
sample of judges was perfectly representative of this universe, one would
expect the sample to reflect nearly the same percentages.
It appears that the sample actually gathered is not representative of
the whole universe, at least on the criteria of gender and region. Of the 13
judges who responded, only 2, or 15.4%, were female (compared to a total
universe of 33.4% female). However, because the overall data strongly
suggest that gender does not matter,72 it is possible that this variance did
not produce any significant bias in the results.73

71The regions described below were based upon combinations of the geographic coverage of the various circuits of the
United States Courts of Appeals.
72 See Table 6 and accompanying text, supra.
73 Bias would result if it could be shown that the two female judges who responded to the survey were unrepresentative of
the larger population of females who responded to the survey. The two female judges disagreed as to whether Brief 1 or Brief
2 was more persuasive. If one eliminates those two responses from the universe of 95 responses, the percentage hardly
changes. Overall, survey participants favored the story brief by a margin of 64.2% to 30.5%; excluding the two female judges
changes that ratio only to 64.5% to 30.1%.
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The regional breakdown of the participants likewise was unrepresentative of the total universe. Seven of the 13 judicial participants were from
Region 3, representing 53.8% of all participants (compared to a total
universe of 22.8% from that region). That anomaly is likely related to the
fact that the principal means of recruiting judicial participants was an email to the American Bar Association’s e-mail list for appellate judges, sent
by the chair of the ABA’s Appellate Judges Conference, Justice Frank
Sullivan of the Indiana Supreme Court. (Indiana is in Region 3.)
The effect, if any, of this overrepresentation of Region 3 is hard to
determine. The seven responding judges from that region split evenly
between the two briefs: three favored the logos brief, three favored the
story brief and one said they were equal. The six judges from the other
regions broke heavily for the story brief: one favored the logos brief, four
favored the story brief and one said they were equal. Given the small
sample size, it is probably impossible to tell whether the Region 3 judges or
the other judges are more representative of the entire universe of judges. It
is safe to say, however, that any bias that results from the overinclusion of
Region 3 judges in the sample appears to be in favor of the logos brief. (Or,
stated conversely, it is possible that judges generally prefer the story brief
more strongly than this sample would suggest.)
The fact that the other groups in the study also favored the story brief
gives me some comfort that the results from the judges are accurate. As
noted in Table 5, above, 73% of the 37 appellate lawyers who participated
in the study found the story brief more persuasive.74 Because presumably
most appellate judges have had previous job experience as appellate
attorneys, the finding that appellate judges also prefer the story briefs is
not surprising.
As for the other groups of participants, there is no readily ascertainable data as to how many lawyers consider themselves to be appellate
lawyers, nor what their gender and regional makeup would be; the same is
true for the other categories. It is thus impossible to determine whether
those samples are representative of those groups.

V. Some Preliminary Conclusions
So what do the data reveal?
Given the relatively small sample size, especially in some groups, it is
hard to draw many general conclusions with confidence. However, the
data do suggest some preliminary conclusions; hopefully, future studies
will help to verify (or not) the following findings.

74 See Table 5, supra. Note also that 75% of the appellate court staff attorneys also rated the story brief as more persuasive.
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A. Overall results
All responses together indicate that the story briefs were more persuasive.
While the appellate judges in the sample tended to prefer the story briefs,
this result was even more pronounced among appellate practitioners. This
response is not surprising; appellate practitioners are the participants who
know the story of their clients most intimately, and therefore they are the
people most likely to understand (and respond to) the power of story. The
data also suggest, however, that advocates should be cautious in this
endeavor; many of the comments from participants (especially those from
law clerks and judges) suggested that overly long briefs and “irrelevant
details” were distracting and ultimately counterproductive.75
Gender appears not to matter at all, but experience seems to. The
longer a participant has been in his or her current job, the more it appears
that the story brief was persuasive.
B. Experience-based differences
Perhaps the most surprising finding of this study was that participants
with less job experience (especially including law clerks) tended to rate the
logos brief more highly than more experienced participants did. It is interesting to consider why experience matters.
Part of the phenomenon might be explained by the fact that the group
of participants with less than five years’ experience in their jobs was the
group that found the logos brief the most persuasive (more than 45% of
that group preferred the logos brief ). Of the 24 participants with less than
five years’ experience in their jobs, nine were law clerks, who as a group
preferred the logos and story briefs equally. (The law clerks were the only
group that did not express an overall preference for the story brief.)
There are probably many possible explanations for why law clerks
scored the logos briefs higher than any other group. Two that come to
mind are these: First, law schools tend to teach that “thinking like a
lawyer” means breaking a fact pattern into small, abstract pieces, applying
logical rules to those fragments, and then reasoning your way to a
conclusion through syllogisms, analogies, or other logical processes.76
Very few courses in a typical law school curriculum focus on the more

75 One appellate judge commented that the story brief “spent too much time on irrelavant [sic] background.” More interestingly, five of the six law clerks who judged the logos brief as more persuasive wrote comments explaining why they
preferred that brief; four of those five said the logos brief was more concise and/or that the story brief contained too many
irrelevant details. See also sampling of comments who favored the logos brief in Part IV–A, supra.
76 The Carnegie Foundation report on legal education describes the nearly ubiquitous case method of instruction as the
“signature pedagogy” of law schools. The “deep structure” of that pedagogy, the authors conclude, “is that ‘thinking like a
lawyer’ is about processes of analytic reasoning.” Sullivan, supra n. 23, at 50–54. The authors also report that one of the
students they interviewed identified “formally structured arguments” as the key to “thinking like a lawyer.” Id. at 40–41.
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human, emotional content of problem solving. Law students, in short, are
primarily trained in logos,77 and not as much in story.
Another plausible explanation may be that law clerks are reading the
briefs with a different purpose in mind. Law clerks are not the readers who
must be persuaded; the judges are. Law clerks may tend to view their job
as helping their judge find the relevant rules of law; thus, briefs that focus
more on the law (rather than the story) are more useful for that purpose.78
If the latter explanation is correct, one might expect that the nine law
clerks in the group of 24 who fell into the “less than five years’ experience”
category might have favored the logos brief at a higher rate than the 15
who were not law clerks. However, that proved not to be the case. The
nine law clerks in that group favored the story brief by a five-to-four
margin (a statistical tie), while the other fifteen paricipants favored the
story brief by an eight-to-seven margin (likewise a statistical tie).79
Comparing the median job experience for each group with the level of
support for the logos brief also reveals an interesting pattern. Table 12 lists
all five groups, in ascending order of the median experience80 in the job
represented in the sample for that group. The third column shows the
level of support each group reported for the logos brief. It reveals a nearly

77 Judge Richard Posner has talked about the “excessively rhetorical emphasis of legal education.” Posner, The Role of the
Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 Boston L. Rev. 1049, 1049 (2006); see also Posner, How Judges Think, supra n. 15, at 219
(“The academic emphasis on the formal grounds of a decision conveys to law students and the bar the impression that every
judge is a thoroughgoing legalist who can therefore be ‘reached’ only by ceaseless iteration of legalist slogans such as ‘plain
meaning’ and by barrages of case citations.”); Brian J. Foley, Applied Legal Storytelling, Politics, and Factual Realism, 14 Leg.
Writing 17, 41 (2008) (“casebook classes and appellate judges focus on logos, whereas clinics—and actual law practice—focus
on all three aspects of persuasion [logos, pathos and ethos].”); Stacy Caplow, Putting the “I” in Wr*t*ing: Drafting an
A/Effective Personal Statement to Tell a Winning Refugee Story, 14 Leg. Writing 249, 259 (“Logos is the process of using logic
and reason to persuade. It is the most familiar approach for lawyers whose training prepares them to routinely argue about
rules and policies and to draw inferences by analogy”); Marjorie L. Silver, Emotional Intelligence and Legal Education, 5
Psychol. Pub. Policy & L. 1173, 1192–93 (1999) (arguing that overemphasis of the Socratic method “alienates students from
the people-centered reality of everyday law practice,” and that law schools should do more to develop the emotional intelligences of their students).
78 When I presented a preliminary version of this article at a faculty colloquium, two of the professors in the audience were
former appellate court clerks. They suggested that the clerks who responded to the survey may have had differing reactions
to the briefs depending upon their relationship with their judge. One of the professors said that his judge typically read the
briefs and made his initial judgment, and then assigned the clerk to assist in writing the judge’s opinion. The other professor
said her judge liked to get the clerks involved with the case before rendering his decision, so that he could talk out alternatives
while reaching his decision. In the former case, the brief became merely a repository of legal rules, so the clerk would likely
view the brief more as a reference to find the law. In the latter case, the brief ’s persuasive content (including the story) might
be more important to the clerk reading the brief.
79 There were also three “appellate court staff attorneys” in the 0–4 years’ experience group. If one groups those responses
with the law clerks, the law clerk/appellate court staff attorneys split 6–6 between the logos and the story briefs, while the rest
of that group (one judge, three practitioners and eight professors) favored the story brief by a 7–5 margin, still a statistical tie.
80 The survey tool asked participants to place themselves within categories setting a five-year range for length of tenure in
their current job, rather than asking them to state the precise number of years the participant had held the job. Thus, the
second column of Table 12 shows the median range of experience reported by the participants, rather than the median years
of experience.
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perfect inversion: the more job experience one has, the less likely one was
to find the logos brief more persuasive.81
Table 12: Comparison of Median Range of Experience
to Preference for Logos Brief
Group
Law clerks
Law professors

Median exp. % Favoring Logos
0–4 years

50%

5–9 years

33.3%

Court staff attorneys

10–14 years

25%

Appellate judges

15–19 years

30.8%

Appellate practitioners

20–24 years

21.6%

All of this suggests that lawyers who have most recently graduated
from law school are likely to be more persuaded by logical argumentation,
since they think that’s what “thinking like a lawyer” means. 82 As lawyers
gain experience, however, the story becomes more persuasive. It is not
clear, however, why this is true. Perhaps it is because “the law” becomes
familiar and the stories become the “new” information that is interesting
and engages the attention of the reader. Or perhaps it is related to the fact
that emotional reasoning (the “story strand” of our DNA molecule)
evolved in the human brain long before logical reasoning.83 Perhaps as we
mature, we learn to trust our emotional reasoning processes more.
This experience-based preference for story has implications for law
school pedagogy, which tends to focus to a high degree on logical
reasoning almost to the exclusion of emotional reasoning. The traditional
law school curriculum has recently come under close scrutiny in two
separate reports: the Carnegie Foundation’s 2007 report Educating
Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law,84 and the Clinical Legal
Education Association’s report that same year, Best Practices for Legal
Education.85 Both of these studies, as well as a number of commentators,86
suggest that law schools should re-evaluate the traditional focus on legal

81 The appellate court staff attorneys and the appellate judges rank third and fourth, respectively, in terms of median experience in their jobs, and fourth and third, respectively, in their level of support for the logos brief. The other three groups fit
the pattern perfectly.
82 Note that the law professor group gave the logos brief the second highest ranking among all five groups. See Table 12,
supra.
83 Jonah Lehrer, How We Decide 24–25 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2009).
84 Sullivan, supra n. 23.
85 Roy Stuckey et al., Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and a Road Map (Clin. Leg. Educ. Assn. 2007).
86 See e.g. Kathryn Stanchi, Step Away from the Case Book: A Call for Balance and Integration in Law School Pedagogy, 43
Harv. Civ. Rights.–Civ. Liberties L. Rev. 611 (2008); David I. C. Thomson, Law School 2.0: Legal Education for a Digital Age
22 (LexisNexis 2009) (“The students of the future will need to know not just how to ‘think like a lawyer’—the traditional
pedagogical goal—but how to ‘act and be a lawyer.’ ”).
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theory and increase training in legal skills. A full examination of this
question is beyond the scope of this article, although I will observe that
changes are starting to happen.87
C. Where do we go from here?
The lesson of my study seems to be that judges are not likely to be
persuaded by logic alone; the stories behind the legal dispute in my test
briefs captured their attention and helped persuade them, regardless of
which side of the case they were randomly assigned to. The data also
suggest that as lawyers gain work experience (or, alternatively, as they gain
distance from their law school training), the power of stories only grows.
These findings have implications not only for how practitioners should
write their briefs, but also for how law professors should think about, and
teach, persuasion.
I have not attempted to address here the question of how stories work.
It seems likely that the reason involves cognitive science and neurobiology,
and the way that a human’s “emotional brain” informs the “logical brain” in
the decision-making process.88 However, I leave a fuller exploration of that
subject to others.89
Likewise, I have not attempted to address the normative question of
whether stories should work. As the reference to the role of empathy in
judicial decision making at the beginning of this article suggests, this is a
matter of some controversy: some judges (and perhaps politicians?) seem
to believe that the law is all about logic and rules, and would therefore

87 See generally Thomson, supra n. 86. The emergence of the Applied Legal Storytelling conferences, described in note 89,
infra, and the scholarship that movement has spawned, is another example of how studies of real-world lawyering are
beginning to inform classroom teaching around the country. See Ruth Anne Robbins, An Introduction to Applied Storytelling
and to This Symposium, 14 Leg. Writing 3 (2008); Foley, supra n. 77.
88 See generally Damasio, supra n. 4.
89 The examination of the role of stories in legal reasoning has gained significant scholarly attention in the last 20 years. See
e.g. Symposium, Lawyers as Storytellers & Storytellers as Lawyers: An Interdisciplinary Symposium Exploring the Use of
Storytelling in the Practice of Law, 18 Vt. L. Rev. 565 (1994); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School:
An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 807 (1993); Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 255 (1994).
Two conferences devoted to the emerging field of Applied Legal Storytelling have recently been held: the first at the City
University of London in July 2007, see generally volume 14 of the Journal of the Legal Writing Institute, which published
several articles arising from presentations at that conference, and the second at the Lewis & Clark Law School, Portland,
Oregon, in June 2009. Both of these conferences brought together a mix of traditional casebook, clinical, and legal writing
faculty from around the world to discuss the role of stories in legal practice.
In addition, legal scholars are starting to examine the neuroscience of how persuasion works. In particular, Professor
Kathryn M. Stanchi of Temple University has written several excellent articles on this subject. See e.g. Kathryn M. Stanchi,
The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 411; Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire: The
Science of Confronting Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 Rutgers L. Rev. 381 (2008); Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Persuasive
Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science of First Impressions to Persuade the Reader (manuscript on file with the
author). See also Ruth Anne Robbins & Steve Johansen, Presentation, This is your Brain on Stories (Applied Legal Storytelling
Conference, Chapter Two: Once Upon a Legal Story, Portland, OR, July 23, 2009) (video available at http://lawmedia.
lclark.edu/LawMedia/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=a07a027332ee44f2b2109cc3c2eece1c).
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deny any role for the “story” of a case (i.e., the human context and the
goals of the litigants) in rendering a decision. These critics may worry that
accepting the fact that stories persuade judges is a significant step down
the road toward the rule of men rather than the rule of law.90 They may
claim that allowing or encouraging judges to respond to stories will give
license to judges to indulge their personal ideological preferences and
predispositions. They may reason that to preserve uniformity, consistency,
and fairness, judges should disregard the “story,” and rule based only upon
logic and legal reasoning.
Much has been written about this topic, and much more remains to
be written. For my part, I would observe first that pure “legal reasoning”
can go only so far; some judicial decisions require a very fact-specific
inquiry.91 (For example, virtually all rules of “law” that require the application of a balancing test require judges to weigh different factors, a
process that does not lend itself well to formulaic and rigid “logical”
rules.92) Second, such an argument assumes that “stories” somehow trigger
inappropriate political or ideological responses in the reader. However,
recall the definition of story that I propose brief writers should employ: “a
detailed, character-based narration of a character’s struggles to overcome

90 The familiar concept that the judicial system should strive for the “rule of law” rather than the “rule of man” is often
attributed to Aristotle. See e.g. Eric G. Zahnd, The Application of Universal Laws To Particular Cases: A Defense of Equity in
Aristotelianism and Anglo-American Law, 59 L. & Contemp. Probs. 263, 266 (1996) (quoting Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
vol. V, 1129019–25 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985)).
91 Indeed, Aristotle himself seems to acknowledge that there are some things that judges must decide which cannot be
decided by strict resort to legal doctrine:
And at this day there are magistrates, for example judges, who have authority to decide some matters
which the law is unable to determine, since no one doubts that the law would command and decide in the best
manner whatever it could. But some things can, and other things cannot, be comprehended under the law, and
this is the origin of the vexed question whether the best law or the best man should rule. For matters of detail
about which men deliberate cannot be included in legislation. Nor does anyone deny that the decision of such
matters must be left to man, but it is argued that there should be many judges, and not one only.
Aristotle, Politics, in Great Books of the Western World vol. 9, 485–486 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., Benjamin Jowet trans.,
William Benton 1952).
Aristotle expanded on this concept in his Nicomachean Ethics:
The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement
which shall be correct. In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so
correctly, the law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is none the less
correct; for the error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of
practical affairs is of this kind from the start. When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which
is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by oversimplicity, to correct the omission—to say what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and
would have put into his law if he had known. Hence the equitable is just, and better than one kind of justice—not
better than absolute justice but better than the error that arises from the absoluteness of the statement. And this
is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality. In fact this is the
reason why all things are not determined by law, that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that
a decree is needed.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Great Books of the Western World vol. 9, 23–24 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., W.D. Ross
trans., William Benton 1952).
92 See text accompanying supra n. 20.
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obstacles and reach an important goal.”93 There is nothing inherently
political94 or ideological about that definition. Characters of all political
stripes struggle to overcome obstacles, and the obstacles can be of any
nature. In fact, this definition of a story talks about story structure, not
story content.95
Kendall Haven, who authored the definition of story that I have used
here, contends that the principal benefit of a “good story” is that it
commands the listener’s (or reader’s) attention.96 (As I routinely tell my
students as they begin to write their appellate briefs, it is impossible to
persuade a judge who is asleep.) Stories also provide the structure that
helps listeners remember a story longer than they would remember a lessstructured narrative.97 In addition, stories improve logical thinking.98 All
of these things are important aids to how judges receive and process a
lawyer’s arguments on behalf of a client, and they are value-neutral.
This is why I agree with Scalia and Garner’s suggestion that it is
permissible to include some legally irrelevant, yet emotionally suggestive,
facts in an appellate brief.99 Stories rely on such facts. The writer’s goal in
an appellate brief is to persuade. Persuasion is best when it comes from
within.100 A writer cannot tell somebody how to feel, but if a feeling arises
within a reader, apparently “unbidden,” then the reader will perceive it as
“real” and inherently believable. If those feelings then form the basis for
the “first impression” as to how the case should come out, the writer has
created a condition in which persuasion is possible. The writer’s job,
therefore, is to tell the client’s story in such a way that these feelings are
likely to emerge from within the reader, from that reader’s “deep frame.” If,
however, the writer uses highly charged, emotional prose, the reader will
see what the writer is up to, will feel manipulated, and will resist.101 As
Scalia and Garner suggest, that can provoke “a nasty backlash” against the
writer.102
Focusing on the story of the case is the most likely route to finding
that sweet spot where a deep frame is activated (becoming the foundation

93 See supra n. 32 and accompanying text.

96 Id. at 8.

94 By this I mean “political” in the traditional sense of
“liberal” or “conservative” biases (or any other axis one
might choose). Stories often are “political” in the sense that
they can be used for political purposes; I merely mean to
suggest that they are not political because both sides of any
divide can equally use stories to make whatever points they
choose to make.

97 Id. at 69–72.

95 “Story is a way of structuring information, a system of
informational elements that most effectively create the
essential context and relevance that engage receivers and
enhance memory and the creation of meaning.” Haven,
supra n. 10, at 15.

101 See id. at 4 (“Frankly, manipulation is an inferior
method of influence.”).

98 Id. at 98–104.
99 Scalia & Garner, supra n. 12, at 32 and 94.
100 “People value their own conclusions more highly than
yours. They will only have faith in a story that has become
real for them personally.” Simmons, supra n. 32, at 3.

102 Scalia & Garner, supra n. 12, at 32.
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of persuasion) without being so obvious that the reader’s natural defenses
are triggered. Stories are natural; they are the way humans have communicated and learned for thousands of years. And, as my study suggests,
stories work.

35

JAWLD_typeset_v18-PRF-04

6/25/10

1:01 PM

Page 36

